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Abstract
We consider a median voter model with uncertainty about how the
economy functions. The distribution of income is exogenously given and
the provision of a public good is financed through a proportional tax.
Voters and politicians do not know the true production function for the
public good, but by using Bayes rule they can learn from experience. We
show that the economy may converge to an inefficient policy where no
further inference is possible so that the economy is stuck in an information
trap.
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...for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn
to walk...
Immanuel Kant
1 Introduction
We consider a median voter model with uncertainty about how the economy
functions. The distribution of income is exogenously given and the provision
of a public good is financed through a proportional tax. Voters and politicians
do not know the true production function for the public good, but by using
Bayes rule they can learn from experience. We show that the economy may
converge to an inefficient policy where no further inference is possible so that
the economy is stuck in an information trap.
We introduce uncertainty by making the following two assumptions about
the production of the public good. First, there are two production functions,
and voters do not know which one is true. Second, the production of the public
good is disturbed by exogenous shocks. In each period voters and politicians
observe the implemented policy and the associated random output of the public
good. Using this information and Bayes rule they update their beliefs about
which production function is true. Each voter has a most preferred policy, which
depends on these common beliefs and her personal income. In every period,
the election outcome and consequently the production of the public good is
determined by the median voter.1
1Blendon et al. (1997) conducted an opinion survey showing that there is a substantial gap
between economists’ and the public’s beliefs about how the economy functions. Fuchs et al.
(1998) report findings from another survey that there are significant differences even among
Berentsen, Bruegger and Loertscher 3
We consider two questions. (1) Does the stochastic process of beliefs and
associated policies converge? (2) If so, where do they converge to? We show
analytically that the policies converge to a random variable. The support of this
random variable includes two policies. Interestingly, one of the policies can be
Pareto inefficient. We use numerical methods to approximate the distribution
of the random variable. The probability of converging to the inefficient policy
increases in the variance of the shocks and in voters’ initial beliefs attributed
to the wrong production function.
There is a substantial political economy literature that deals with incomplete
information. However, most of this literature deals with asymmetric informa-
tion in the sense that some types of agents are better informed than others.2
Closer related to our work is the seminal paper by Piketty (1995), in which
agents have to learn the parameters of the model. In his model, agents have
heterogenous initial beliefs and have access to heterogenous private informa-
tion, which is why they end up with heterogenous beliefs even in the long run.
Obviously, at most one of these beliefs can be correct. In contrast, in our model
all voters share the same information and beliefs, but are eventually hindered
from learning the truth because further inference becomes impossible once they
always observe the same outcome (or more precisely, once they always observe
outcomes that have the same probability under either production function).
Spector (2000) builds on Piketty’s paper and considers a cheap talk game in
professional economists about policy questions as well as parameter estimates. This can be
regarded as evidence of uncertainty about which is the correct model.
2See, for example, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), Blumkin and Grossmann (2004) or
Schultz (2004).
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which all agents derive identical utility from a collective decision, but differ with
respect to their beliefs. His assumptions are the converse of ours as we assume
that all voters have the same information but are affected in different ways from
the same policy. Our paper also relates to the literature on Bayesian learning
(see, e.g., McLennan, 1984; Easley and Kiefer, 1988), which has established that
impatient optimizers may optimally fail to learn the true parameter values. The
model of Alesina and Angeletos (2003) is very similar to ours in that different
beliefs are consistent with different equilibria, so that different social beliefs and
political outcomes are self-reproducing. An important difference is that in their
model the equilibria can be ranked unambiguously only from the point of view
of the median voter. Moreover, the sources of multiplicity are quite different. It
stems from differences in social beliefs about which fraction of income is fair or
merited in their model, whereas in ours it arises from incomplete information
and eventually incomplete learning.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the basic
model is outlined. In section, 3 we introduce uncertainty and the dynamic
learning process of voters, and we show that this process converges. We derive
also a lower bound for the probability that in the long run a Pareto efficient
policy is adopted. In section 4, we then report simulation results that strongly
support the view that the probability of reaching a Pareto inefficient policy is
strictly positive for a wide set of initial conditions. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The basic model
Our starting point is the model developed by Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch.
3), which builds on the seminal work of Meltzer and Richard (1981).3 We first
describe the model without uncertainty.
2.1 The Hotelling-Downs model with a public good
There is a continuum of individuals whose total mass is normalized to one.
Individual income yi is distributed according to the differentiable distribution
function F (yi), where f(yi) = F ′(yi) denotes the probability density function.
The mean income is denoted by y and the median income by ym. The support
of the distribution is [0, ysup] with ysup < ∞. Each individual i derives utility
from private consumption ci and from a public good H(g), which is a function
of government expenditure g. Therefore, individual i’s utility is
ui = ci + H(g). (1)
Note that individuals differ only with respect to their private consumption, but
are identical with respect to their valuation of the public good.
The government’s budget constraint is
g = τy, (2)
where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 is a flat tax rate. Accordingly, individual i’s consumption is
ci = (1− τ)yi. (3)
We make the following assumptions for the production function H(g). As-
sumption 1: H(g) is twice differentiable and strictly concave. Assumption 2:
3We thank Roland Hodler for suggesting writing down the model in this way.
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∂H
∂g (0) >
ysup
y > 0. Assumption 3:
∂H
∂g (y) < 0. These assumptions imply that
H(g) has a unique interior maximum in [0, y] which avoids boundary solutions
in the voting model we consider below.
Using the budget restrictions (2) and (3) and normalizing mean income y
to one, we can rewrite (1) to get i’s utility from policy τ
ui(τ) = (1− τ)yi + H(τ). (4)
Note that H(τ) is concave in τ . Moreover, because of Assumption 2, we have
∂H
∂τ (0) > y
sup.
By τ i we denote individual i’s optimal tax rate, which is implicitly defined
by
∂H
∂τ
(τ i) = yi. (5)
Since H(τ) is concave, τ i is decreasing in yi. Thus, the single crossing property
is satisfied (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, ch. 2, condition 2.4). Denote by
τm the optimal tax rate of the median income voter.
2.2 Pareto efficient and Pareto inefficient policies
The optimal tax rate of the richest individual τ I is defined by H ′(τ I) = ysup.
Assumption 2 implies τ I > 0; some government activity is better than none for
all individuals, even for the richest one. The optimal tax rate of the poorest
individual τ II is defined by H ′(τ II) = 0. Assumption 3 implies τ II < 1, so
even the poorest individual will prefer τ II to any higher tax rate. The interval
P ≡ [τ I , τ II ] ⊂ [0, 1] contains all Pareto efficient tax rates. Accordingly, the
regions [0, τ I) and (τ II , 1] contain Pareto inefficient policies.
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Figure 1: Pareto efficient and inefficient policies.
Figure 1 illustrates the set of Pareto efficient tax rates. This is also the
interval of conflictual politics since voters do not unanimously agree which of
these policies are better or worse. This is in contrast to policies τ /∈ P , which
are considered by all individuals worse than either τ I or τ II .
2.3 Median voter equilibrium
We assume that every individual votes for the policy available which is closest
to the policy that maximizes its utility given in (4). We focus on two party
competition. Parties (or candidates) are opportunistic and derive utility solely
from being in office. Parties simultaneously choose a policy τ ∈ [0, 1], which
they commit to implement. The parties maximize the number of votes as
opposed to maximizing the probability of winning. If both parties get the
same number of votes, the winner is drawn by flipping a fair coin. Under
the assumptions made, the unique equilibrium of the game is the well-known
median voter equilibrium. Both parties choose τm as their policy and the winner
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is chosen randomly.
3 The model with uncertainty
In this section, we introduce uncertainty by making the following two assump-
tions. First, there are two possible production functions, labelled HA(τ) and
HB(τ), only one of which is true, both satisfying the assumptions of section 2.
Second, the production of the public good is disturbed by some factors exoge-
nous to the model. Voters and politicians have some initial beliefs about which
production function is the true one. They use the observed outcomes to update
their beliefs.
3.1 Uncertainty and its unravelling
Without loss of generality, we assume that HA(τ) is the true production func-
tion. Let PA ≡ [τ IA, τ IIA ] and PB ≡ [τ IB, τ IIB ] be the sets of Pareto efficient tax
rates associated with the production function HA and HB, respectively. Let τmA
and τmB be the optimal tax rates for the median voter under HA and HB, i.e.,
∂HA
∂τ
(τmA ) = y
m and
∂HB
∂τ
(τmB ) = y
m. (6)
Note that τmA ∈ PA and τmB ∈ PB. Without loss of generality we assume that
τmA < τ
m
B . Furthermore, we assume that the two functions cross exactly once
at τ̃ , and that τ̃ ∈ [τmA , τmB ].
The production of the public good is exposed to uncertainty. If τt is the tax
rate in period t, then voters (and politicians) observe the outcome
ht(τt, εt) = HA(τt) + εt , (7)
Berentsen, Bruegger and Loertscher 9
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Figure 2: Two production functions.
where εt is an error term drawn randomly in every period.4 It is common
knowledge that the error terms are normally and i.i.d. with mean 0 and variance
σ2; we denote its probability density function by φ(εt). Note that without
noise, the learning process, described below, would be degenerate since one
observation would be sufficient to identify the true production function.
The time line is as shown in Figure 3. In every period t, an election takes
t=1 t=2
        policy
implementation 
α
1
 α2 τ1 
realization
 of shock
election
outcome
updatingvoting
  policy
outcome
ε
1
 h
1
 
initial
belief
updated
 belief
Figure 3: The time line.
place, t = 1, 2, ... . Both implemented policies and the outcomes from these
4The error term ε captures factors influencing the policy outcome except the policy itself.
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policies are observed ex post. That is, in period t + 1, the entire history
Ht ≡ {(hj , τj)}tj=1 of previously implemented tax rates and associated pol-
icy outcomes is common knowledge. The beliefs of voters and politicians in
period t that HA is the true production function are denoted by αt. Then the
expected level of the public good in period t for tax rate τt is
Ht(τt) ≡ αtHA(τt) + (1− αt)HB(τt) . (8)
Proposition 1 In every period t, both candidates take the position τmt , where
τmt is implicitly defined by
H ′t(τ
m
t ) = αtH
′
A(τ
m
t ) + (1− αt)H ′B(τmt ) = ym . (9)
Proof. Since HA and HB are concave, Ht(τt) is concave. For any concave
function and beliefs αt, the distribution function for τ it can be derived using
standard techniques for the transformation of random variables.5 Let τ it = κ(yi)
denote the inverse of the function yi = H ′t(τ it ) derived from the optimality
condition (5) of the model without uncertainty. Since H ′′t (τ it ) exists,
dyi
dτ it
=
H ′′t (τ it ). If we denote by Ω(τ it ) the distribution of τ it , then the density ω(τ it ) of
Ω(τ it ) is given by
ω(τ it ) = f(κ(τ
i
t )) |
dyi
dτ it
|, (10)
where | dyi
dτ i
| denotes the absolute value of the derivative dyi
dτ it
= H ′′t (τ it ). Conse-
quently, the optimal tax rate of the voter with the median income is the median
optimal tax rate, which is denoted by τmt . The median voter theorem applies
and the median optimal tax rate will be implemented. 2
Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium outcome, as stated in Proposition 1. Initial
5See, e.g., Hogg and Craig (1995).
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Figure 4: Equilibrium outcome in period 1.
beliefs α1 are such that the expected production function in period 1 is H1, so
that the policy implemented in period 1 is τm1 .
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of the error term on the beliefs and on the
equilibrium tax rate in the next period. After implementing τm1 , the shock
ε1 materializes. If ε1 > 0, the outcome is better than expected under H1,
and therefore, updated beliefs are α2 > α1 and the new expected production
function H2 is as shown in the left hand panel. On the other hand, if ε1 < 0, the
outcome is worse than expected under H1, and therefore, beliefs are downgraded
to α2 < α1, yielding H2 as shown in the right hand panel. In both cases, the
expected production function H2 is the basis for equilibrium in period 2.
Next we show that only a strict subset of the feasible tax rates τ ∈ [0, 1] are
implemented in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let τmt be the median tax rate in any period t. Then,
τmt ∈ [τmA , τmB ] ∀t.
Proof. By Proposition 1, in any period t the median voter’s optimal tax rate
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Figure 5: Inferences and outcome in period 2, as a function of ε1.
under the expected production function Ht(τt) defined in (8) is implemented
in equilibrium. Since by definition ∂HA∂τ (τ
m
A ) =
∂HB
∂τ (τ
m
B ) and since HA(τ) and
HB(τ) are both concave, we know that ∂HA∂τ > y
m and ∂HB∂τ > y
m for all τ < τmA .
Hence, since αt ≤ 1 for all t, τmt ≥ τmA for all t follows. Symmetric arguments
can be applied to rule out τmt > τ
m
B . 2
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 6.
0 1
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1
1.5
2
2.5
3
τ
H
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range of τm
t
τm
A
 τm
B
slope = ym 
Figure 6: Range of equilibrium tax rates.
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3.2 An informal discussion of the convergence results
The voters’ problem in our model is basically a problem of inference. Recall that
Ht ≡ {(hi, τi)}ti=1 is the publicly observed history up to date t. Accordingly,
let Pr(HA
∣∣Ht) denote the conditional probability that HA is true given history
Ht. Denote by Pr(ht
∣∣HA, τt) the probability of observing ht given that HA is
true and given that policy τt is implemented. Then, by Bayes rule
Pr(HA|Ht) = Pr(HA|Ht−1) Pr(ht|HA,τt)Pr(HA|Ht−1) Pr(ht|HA,τt)+(1−Pr(HA|Ht−1)) Pr(ht|HB ,τt) . (11)
Since voters are rational, they use Bayes rules (11) to update their beliefs, i.e.,
αt+1 = Pr(HA|Ht). For the initial period, we assume 0 < α1 < 1. Since the
probability of observing ht is higher under the true production function HA
than under the wrong one HB, αt+1 should be expected to converge to 1 as
the number of observations gets large. However, recall that the two produc-
tion functions intersect at τ̃ which implies that Pr(ht|HA, τ̃) = Pr(ht|HB, τ̃).
Inspection of (11) reveals that in this case, αt+1 = αt. The observation ht is
equally likely under production function HA as under HB. In this case, the
learning process comes to a halt. Let α̃ be the belief such that in political
equilibrium τ̃ is implemented. That is, α̃ solves
α̃H ′A(τ̃) + (1− α̃)H ′B(τ̃) = ym,
where τ̃ is such that HA(τ̃) = HB(τ̃). Clearly, α̃ ∈ (0, 1) exists. Moreover,
the fact ∂α̃∂ym < 0 is readily established by noting that for a given belief α,
the preferred tax rate of any voter decreases in her income. Therefore, as the
median income increases, a higher belief that HB is true is required for the
median voter’s preferred tax rate to be τ̃ , and hence, α̃ decreases in ym.
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This raises two important questions: (1) Does the stochastic process of
beliefs and policies converge? (2) If so, to what beliefs and policies does it con-
verge? In Section 3.3 we show that the process of beliefs converges to a random
variable whose support consists solely of α̃ and 1 and that this is equivalent to
saying that the policy converges to a random variable whose support is τ̃ and
τmA .
Another question is how likely the convergence to the policy τ̃ is. In Section
4 we use numerical methods to approximate the probability of reaching α̃ and
1 (or equivalently τ̃ and τmA ) as a function of initial conditions such as initial
beliefs, the shape of the production functions and the variance of shocks. Our
simulations suggest that convergence to τ̃ occurs for a wide range of initial
conditions. This is interesting because τ̃ can be Pareto inefficient.
3.3 Convergence of the stochastic process
We now state our main results. These are (1) that in the long-run, the equilib-
rium policy and equilibrium beliefs converge and (2) that they do not necessarily
converge to a Pareto efficient policy and the true probability, respectively. We
comment on these findings after the proposition and its proof.
Proposition 3 There exists a random variable τ∞ ∈ [0, 1] such that
1. τmt → τ∞ almost surely as t →∞, and
2. the support of τ∞ is {τ̃ , τmA }.
Proof. We prove Proposition 3 by showing that the voters beliefs αt converge
to a random variable α∞ almost surely. From Proposition 1 we then get the
convergence result for τmt .
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We first define the function
s(τ) ≡ HA(τ)−HB(τ) for τ ∈ [τmA , τmB ] . (12)
The fact that s′(τ) < 0 for τ ∈ [τmA , τmB ] is readily established, using H ′A(τ) <
H ′B(τ) for τ ∈ [τmA , τmB ], which follows from concavity of both HA and HB and
the fact that H ′A(τ
m
A ) = H
′
B(τ
m
B ), noted in (6). Note that for τ̃ ∈ [τmA , τmB ],
s(τ̃) = 0. Therefore, s(τmA ) > 0 and s(τ
m
B ) < 0. Figure 7 provides an illustra-
tion.
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Figure 7: An illustration of the function s(τ).
Let us also define the function τm(αt), which is the tax rate solving equation
(9) as a function of the beliefs αt. So for a given belief αt we have τmt = τ
m(αt),
the unique optimal tax rate of the median voter. Using the implicit function
theorem, we have
∂τmt
∂αt
=
−s′(τmt )
αtH ′′A(τ
m
t ) + (1− αt)H ′′B(τmt )
< 0 , (13)
since −s′ > 0 and αtH ′′A + (1 − αt)H ′′B < 0 by concavity. This is also quite
intuitive. As the beliefs that HA is true increase, the equilibrium tax rate
decreases, i.e., is closer to τmA . Finally, let us define
w(αt) ≡ s(τm(αt)), (14)
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which gives us the difference between the two production function in equilibrium
as a function of the beliefs in period t. The function w is defined on the
interval [0, 1]. The fact that ∂w∂αt = s
′τm′ > 0 follows immediately from the
above observations. Moreover, because with τ̃ ∈ [τmA , τmB ], s(τ̃) = 0, we have
w(α(τ̃)) = 0 for a unique α̃ ∈ (0, 1) and −∞ < w(0) < 0 < w(1) < ∞.
Let α1 = Pr(HA) and 1−α1 = Pr(HB) be the exogenously given prior beliefs
that HA and HB are true, respectively. After observing history H1 = (h1, τ1),
voters apply Bayes rule to get
α2 = Pr(HA|H1) = α1 Pr(h1|HA)
α1 Pr(h1|HA) + (1− α1) Pr(h1|HB)
=
Pr(HA) Pr(h1|HA)
Pr(HA) Pr(h1|HA) + Pr(HB) Pr(h1|HB) .
After observing history H2 = {(hi, τi)}2i=1, they use α2 and Bayes rule to get
α3 = Pr(HA|H2) = α2 Pr(h2|HA)
Pr(HA) Pr(h2|HA) + (1− α2) Pr(h2|HB)
=
Pr(HA) Pr(h1|HA) Pr(h2|HA)
Pr(HA) Pr(h1|HA) Pr(h2|HA) + Pr(HB) Pr(h1|HB) Pr(h2|HB) .
By induction, after observing history Ht = {(hi, τi)}ti=1, we’ll have
αt+1 =
Pr(HA) Pr(h1|HA) Pr(h2|HA)... Pr(ht|HA)
Pr(HA) Pr(h1|HA) Pr(h2|HA)... Pr(ht|HA) + Pr(HB) Pr(h1|HB) Pr(h2|HB)... Pr(ht|HB)
or equivalently
αt+1 =
1
1 + Pr(HB) Pr(h1|HB) Pr(h2|HB)... Pr(ht|HB)Pr(HA) Pr(h1|HA) Pr(h2|HA)... Pr(ht|HA)
. (15)
Since by assumption εt is distributed according to the normal with mean zero
and variance σ2, which we denote as φ(.), substituting yields6
Pr(ht|HA) = φ(ht −HA(τt)) = φ(εt) and
Pr(ht|HB) = φ(ht −HB(τt)) = φ(s(τt) + εt) .
6Note that for a continuous random variable any single observation has probability zero.
Nonetheless, L’Hopital’s rule can be used to determine to posterior probability, so that the
density rather than the cdf is appropriate.
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Thus, using (14) we can write (15) as
αt+1 =
1
1 + (1−α1)φ(w(α1)+ε1)φ(w(α2)+ε2)...φ(w(αt)+εt)α1φ(ε1)φ(ε2)...φ(εt)
. (16)
Define
Nt+1 ≡ (1− α1)φ(w(α1) + ε1)φ(w(α2) + ε2) · ... · φ(w(αt) + εt)
α1φ(ε1)φ(ε2) · ... · φ(εt) , (17)
such that (16) becomes
αt+1 =
1
1 + Nt+1
. (18)
That is, (18) defines αt = α(Nt) with
∂α(Nt)
∂Nt
< 0. Note also that αt+1 ∈ (0, 1] ⇔
Nt+1 ∈ [0,∞). Moreover, we can now define a sequence of random variables
{Ni}ti=1, the initial value of which is exogenously given as N1 = 1−α1α1 . Finally
define r(Nt) ≡ w(α(Nt)), where
∂r
∂Nt
=
∂w
∂αt
∂αt
∂Nt
< 0
is readily established. It is also easy to see that r(0) = w(1) > 0 and that
limNt→∞ r(Nt) = w(0) < 0. Thus, for τ̃ ∈ [τmA , τmB ], there is a unique Ñ such
that
r(Ñ) = 0. (19)
In light of these new definitions,
Nt+1 = N1 · φ(r(N1) + ε1)
φ(ε1)
· φ(r(N2) + ε2)
φ(ε2)
· ... · φ(r(Nt) + εt)
φ(εt)
= Nt · φ(r(Nt) + εt)
φ(εt)
= Nt · e−
r(Nt)
2σ2
(r(Nt)+2εt) . (20)
Notice that (20) is a non-linear stochastic first-order difference equation.
Observe first that if the sequence takes either the value 0, the value Ñ , or
is infinity, it will take this value forever. This becomes immediate for Nt = 0
by inserting Nt = 0 into (20). For Nt = Ñ , note that r(Ñ) = 0 implies that the
exponent in (20) becomes 0 for any εt, implying Nt+1 = Ñ . If Nt is infinity,
Nt+1 will be too, since limNt→∞ r(Nt) is a finite negative number.
Note also that the sequence {Nt} is a martingale. The reason is first that
E[Nt+1]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
Nt+1 · φ(ε1, ε2, ..., εt) dε1 dε2 ... dεt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
N1 · φ(r(N1) + ε1) · ... · φ(r(Nt) + εt) dε1 dε2 ... dεt
= N1 < ∞,
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where the joint normal φ(ε1, ε2, ..., εt) = φ(ε1) ·φ(ε2) · ... ·φ(εt) by independence.
Second,
E[Nt+1|{Ni}ti=1] = Nt
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(r(Nt) + εt)
φ(εt)
φ(εt) dεt
= Nt
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(r(Nt) + εt) dεt = Nt .
The martingale convergence theorem (e.g., Durrett, 2005, p. 233) states that Nt
converges almost surely to a limit N∞ with E[N∞] < ∞. For the interpretation
of our model, it is necessary to evaluate the random variable N∞. Lemma 1
states that the martingale either converges towards 0 or towards Ñ .
Lemma 1 The support of the random variable N∞ is {0, Ñ}.
Proof. From the observation we made above, we know that Pr(Nt+1 =
0|Nt = 0) = 1 and Pr(Nt+1 = Ñ |Nt = Ñ) = 1. We now prove by contradiction
that there exists no other value C the martingale Nt can converge to. Note that
the martingale convergence theorem directly states that Nt cannot converge to
infinity.
Assume there exists a number C ∈ (0,∞) where Nt can converge to. Then,
for every δ ∈ IR such that 0 6∈ [C− δ, C + δ] and Ñ 6∈ [C− δ, C + δ], there exists
a time period tδ, for which we have Ntδ+i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ] for i = 0, 1, ... . Note
that δ can be chosen arbitrarily small. Now define the variable εtδ+i by
εtδ+i ≡
σ2
r(Ntδ+i)
· ln Ntδ+i
C + δ
− 1
2
r(Ntδ+i) . (21)
Note that εtδ+i is a shock such that Ntδ+i+1 = C + δ. Assume that C < Ñ .
Then, the variable εtδ+i is negative and finite for all Ntδ+i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ],
because all terms in (21) are finite. Therefore, for every Ntδ+i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ],
Pr(εtδ+i < εtδ+i) = Φ(εtδ+i) > 0 , (22)
which means that the probability to draw an εtδ+i < εtδ+i is strictly positive
for every Ntδ+i ∈ [C − δ, C + δ]. Thus, with a positive probability we observe
an Ntδ+i+1 > C + δ for every period tδ + i because Ntδ+i+1 depends negatively
on εtδ+i. This means, that
inf
Ntδ+i∈[C−δ,C+δ]
Pr(Ntδ+i+1 6∈ [C − δ, C + δ]) > 0 ,
which is a contradiction to the assumption of convergence of Nt. Hence, Nt
cannot converge to C.
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In order to prove non-convergence towards a C > Ñ , we define εtδ+i as
εtδ+i ≡
σ2
r(Ntδ+i)
· ln Ntδ+i
C − δ −
1
2
r(Ntδ+i)
and use the equivalent reasoning as above.
We are now only left to show that the probability of Nt converging to the set
union of all C is still 0. By choosing intervals around C with rational endpoints,
the probabilities can be summed up for the union set. Since we can choose δ
arbitrarily, it is always possible to find an interval with rational endpoints for all
C. Therefore, the sum of probabilities over these intervals is 0. This completes
the proof of Lemma 1. 2
From Slutzki’s Theorem we know that if Nt converges to N∞ with support
{0, Ñ} almost surely, then αt converges to α∞ with support {α̃, 1} almost
surely. For the belief αt = 1 the tax rate τmA is implemented, for α̃ it is τ̃ .
Therefore, the support of τ∞ is {τmA , τ̃}. This completes the proof of Proposi-
tion 3. 2
3.4 The efficiency potential
Proposition 3 states that the economy converges to either τmA or τ̃ . If τ
II
A <
τ̃ < τ IB the Pareto sets of HA and HB are disjoint and τ̃ lies in between them,
i.e., is Pareto inefficient. The conditions for this require that HA and HB are
sufficiently different. From now on we assume that τ̃ is Pareto inefficient.
Corollary 1 If τ IIA < τ̃ < τ
I
B, then the economy can converge to a Pareto
inefficient policy.
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An interesting question is how likely it is that voters end up with a Pareto
efficient policy. However, the distribution of τ∞ cannot be determined analyti-
cally. That means, the probabilities that the political economy converges to τ̃
and to τmA cannot be derived analytically as a function of initial conditions. In
Section 4 we will use numerical simulations to approximate this distribution.
Yet we attain an analytical result for the lower bound of the probability that
the policy converges to τmA . For that purpose, we define the efficiency potential
as this minimal probability, which we denote as ξ. That is,
ξ ≡ inf Pr
(
lim
t→∞ τt → τ
m
A | α1, τ̃
)
.
Proposition 4 ξ = max
{
0, α1−α̃α1(1−α̃)
}
.
Proof. From Proposition 3 we know that αt either converges to 1 or to α̃.
What we need to characterize in order to prove Proposition 4 is actually the
distribution of the random variable N∞ over {0, Ñ}, from which we can then
deduce the distribution of the random variable α∞ over {1, α̃}
Corollary 2.11 in Durrett (2005) implies that E[N∞] ≤ E[N1]. Let µ be the
probability of convergence towards Ñ . Then
E[N∞] = (1− µ) · 0 + µ · Ñ = µ · Ñ
⇒ µ ≤ N1
Ñ
⇒ (1− µ) ≥ 1− N1
Ñ
,
where it will be recalled that N1 = 1−α1α1 . As it is a probability, ξ must be
nonnegative. It equals the minimum value of (1− µ) if (1− µ) > 0. It follows
that
ξ = max
{
0, 1− N1
Ñ
}
= max
{
0, 1−
1−α1
α1
1−α̃
α̃
}
= max
{
0,
α1 − α̃
α1(1− α̃)
}
.
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2
Note that unless α1 = 1 (in which case the problem is degenerate), ξ is strictly
less than one. Taking first derivatives, we get ∂ξ∂α1 > 0 and
∂ξ
∂α̃ < 0 for ξ > 0.
Clearly, these derivatives are only valid for α1 > α̃. Otherwise, ξ′ = 0.
The first observation is intuitive, since it is natural to expect voters who are
initially better informed to be more likely to converge to the correct belief in the
long run. The sign of the derivative ∂ξ∂α̃ < 0 is also intuitive, but understanding
it requires a moment’s reflection. For a given α1 > α̃, a series of bad shocks
is required for the beliefs to be downgraded to α̃. Obviously, as α̃ decreases, a
longer series of bad shocks is required for beliefs to be downgraded to α̃. Since
a longer series of bad shocks is less likely, the efficiency potential increases as
α̃ decreases. As noted above, ∂α̃∂ym < 0. Therefore, the efficiency potential
increases in the median income. That is, on average richer countries should be
associated with better policies. Note, though, that this prediction of the model
hinges on the assumption that HA is the true production function. Were HB
true, then the efficiency potential would decrease in ym.
4 Numerical Results
Of course, we are not only interested in determining the efficiency potential,
which after all gives us only a minimal probability of reaching the good policy.
It is equally interesting to learn something about the probability of implement-
ing the bad policy in the long run. Unfortunately, as explained above, the
distribution of α∞ cannot be calculated explicitly. We therefore have to rely
on simulations in order to approximate the probability that beliefs converge
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to α∞ = α̃ and α∞ = 1, respectively. This probability is a function of initial
beliefs, the noisiness of the production functions, and the production functions,
and in particular of the slope s(τ̃).
4.1 Simulations for different initial beliefs
The simulation results are collected in the two tables below for two different
constellations of production functions. Figure 8 shows three functions which are
taken as the production function of the public good. For Table 1, we use the blue
function (HA) as the true production function, and the green function (HG) as
the alternative production function. For Table 2, again the blue function (HA)
is the true production function and the red one (HR) is the alternative. An
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Figure 8: The functions used for the simulations reported in Tables 1 and 2.
entry in the table is the share of draws for which the belief converged to 1 for
a given combination of initial belief α1 and noise σ. For every entry we did
a hundred draws. One minus the table entry gives the share of draws that
converged to the inefficient tax rate.7 For example, the 1 in the top left entry
of Table 1 means that for α1 = 0.1 and σ = 0.2 every draw converged to 1, for
the blue (true) and green (untrue) production function. Note that the smaller
7It is reassuring that all draws either converge to τmA or to τ̃ .
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HA and HG
α̃ = 0.47
σ = 0.2 σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2 ξ
α1 = 0.1 1 0.99 0.21 0.01 0
α1 = 0.2 1 0.98 0.26 0.02 0
α1 = 0.3 1 0.98 0.24 0 0
α1 = 0.4 1 0.99 0.21 0 0
α1 = 0.5 1 0.97 0.25 0.10 0.12
α1 = 0.6 1 1 0.57 0.48 0.42
α1 = 0.7 1 0.99 0.76 0.67 0.62
α1 = 0.8 1 1 0.94 0.76 0.78
Table 1: Results when HA is true and HG is the alternative.
HA and HR
α̃ = 0.52
σ = 0.2 σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2 ξ
α1 = 0.1 0.99 0.36 0.01 0 0
α1 = 0.2 1 0.29 0 0 0
α1 = 0.3 1 0.28 0 0 0
α1 = 0.4 1 0.29 0 0 0
α1 = 0.5 1 0.21 0 0 0
α1 = 0.6 1 0.58 0.31 0.29 0.27
α1 = 0.7 1 0.75 0.59 0.58 0.53
α1 = 0.8 1 0.92 0.76 0.71 0.73
α1 = 0.9 1 0.96 0.91 0.90 0.88
Table 2: Results when HA is true and HR is the alternative.
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σ, the higher the probability of reaching τmA . This is intuitive because a smaller
variance of the shocks increases the informativeness of the policy outcome.
4.2 Probability of convergence as a function of noise
It is also interesting to see how the long run equilibrium depends on the noise in
the production function. For that purpose, we simulated an economy with two
given production functions and given initial beliefs, and let only the variance
of the error term vary. The results are depicted in Figure 9.
Specifically, we simulated for the functions HA(τ) = ln(τ + 0.003) − 4(τ +
0.003) + 6 and HB = 8.9τ − 5.5τ2, which gives us a τ̃ = 0.543. We set α1 = 12
and ym = 12 . Note that the maximal value of HA is 3.61. Then α̃ = 0.5744,
and the efficiency potential of this political economy is 0. The results are very
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Figure 9: Simulation results when only the variance of the error varies.
intuitive as it is natural to expect that the noisier public production, the harder
it is to learn the truth and consequently, the less likely it is to converge to τmA .
As we discuss in the conclusions, this indicates that if it is possible to reduce
σ2, this would be very effective in increasing the likelihood of convergence to
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τmA .
4.3 The information trap
The reason why there is an environment around τ̃ from which the policy can
eventually not escape is that the two production functions have very similar
values in the neighborhood of τ̃ . The closer one gets to τ̃ , the less distinguishable
the true and the false production function become. Once one is close enough
to τ̃ , it thus becomes very difficult to learn anything from observations. Hence,
the economy becomes stuck with its current beliefs once these are sufficiently
close to α̃, as a consequence of which policy will not change anymore. Hence,
one can speak of an information trap around τ̃ , because voters cannot gather
any new information.
All voters then know and perfectly agree that policy τ̃ is not Pareto efficient.
That is, they are all perfectly aware that their policy is lost somewhere in the
middle. So, why do they not just change the policy? As the same policy affects
different people in different ways, they do not agree in which direction they
should move. Given beliefs α̃, low income voters would prefer tax rates τ > τ̃ ,
while rich individuals would prefer smaller tax rates, and the median voter ym
finds τ̃ optimal. Since once τ̃ is implemented, it will be implemented forever,
there is a kind of prisoner’s dilemma flavor associated with this outcome.
The simulation results reported above strongly suggest that the economy
can converge to τ̃ for a wide range of initial conditions. This suggests that
even if the median voter (and all his neighbors) could coordinate on some small
policy experiments and vote for tax rates slightly higher or lower than τ̃ , the
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society still faces the problem that it will eventually fall back into the trap.
In order to truly escape the trap, some large scale experimentation would be
required, like, e.g., implementing τ̃2 or 2τ̃ , in order to induce beliefs to change
substantially enough. So as to make clear how voters could coordinate on such
a change, a very different model would have to be developed.
5 Conclusions
Putnam (1993) has raised the question why some democratic governments fail
and others succeed. He explains the failure and success of democracies by refer-
ring to differences in political institutions and attitudes. We have provided an
alternative explanation why, in general, political outcomes in initially identical
societies may differ in the long run and more specifically, why some democra-
cies may adopt Pareto inferior policies even in the long run. Our explanation,
which we see largely as complementary to Putnam’s, rests on the assumption
that voters face uncertainty and that uncertainty can only be unravelled by
experience. The basic reason why initially identical countries may end up with
different outcomes is that in combination with bad luck the political equilibrium
may impede further inferences, so that uncertainty is never abolished.8 Since
in our model economies may fail to converge to Pareto efficient policies as a
consequence of bad shocks, its predictions are consistent with the observations
of Easterly (2001), who notes that some countries’ meager growth performance
8Among other things, we have shown that initial beliefs may be crucial for the long run
political outcome. This may help better understand the economic and political difficulties
former colonies face who may have been endowed with bad initial beliefs at the time of
independence, as emphasized, e.g., by Bauer (1981).
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may be caused by bad luck.
Are there any lessons to be learnt from our model for policy makers and
policy advisors? Though it is arguably hard or even impossible to directly affect
people’s beliefs, it is not necessarily true that these beliefs cannot be influenced
at all. Anything that reduces the variance in the public production function
has a positive effect on the probability of converging to a Pareto efficient policy.
So, if it is possible to reduce this variance, e.g., by sharpening the predictions of
the competing models a society believes in, the long run beliefs of a society, and
consequently its policies, may be different. Thus, even in our model societies
are not simply doomed to fail.
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